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The timeline of the Black civil rights movement in the United States reveals a 
long history of struggle for liberation, advancement, equality and full 
citizenship.  Each gain has invariably met with either swift retaliation on the 
societal level or more subdued, gradual and systemic retrenchment. In each 
historical era, retaliation and reversal have caused profound losses—of bodily 
integrity and life, and legal and political rights. The 2013 decision by the 
Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder to eviscerate the Voting Rights Act 
of 19651 is but one of the most recent losses that can be recorded on the 
timeline of struggle for racial justice in the United States.2  
 
I. Legal Post-Racialism 
 
 Professor Sumi Cho argued in 2009 that it was too early to judge 
whether the Supreme Court would take a “post-racial turn” in its 
jurisprudence. 3  Post-racialism “in its current iteration is a twenty-first 
century ideology that reflects a belief that due to racial progress the state 
need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, 
and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of 
social action.”4 Cho posits that the imminence of a post-racial philosophical 
and rhetorical shift in the Court’s jurisprudence depends upon whether 
“cases dealing with racial remediation effectuate a retreat from race5.” Four 
indicators in Court opinions of a post-racial retreat include: (1) a claim that 
“racial progress or transcendence” is sufficient to render race-based remedies 
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1 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012), hereinafter “VRA.”  
3 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1620-21 (2009). 
4 Id. at 1594. 
5 Id. at 1621. 
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unnecessary in the present day; (2) promotion of  “race-neutral universalism” 
not only as a normative, aspirational ideal—as in the Doctrine of 
Colorblindness—but as a descriptive, operational reality; (3) the drawing of  
“moral equivalences” between racism and race-based civil rights remedies; 
and (4) any language that indicates a general “distancing from standard civil-
rights approaches.”6 Based on these criteria the majority opinion in Shelby 
County strongly indicates a move toward post-racialism in the jurisprudence 
of the Court.  
A. Racial Progress and Transcendence 
 The VRA, particularly Section 4, contains the memory of American 
racial injustice and its ongoing legacy. 7  It covers the Deep South—the 
original Confederate states that seceded from the Union and fought the Civil 
War over their ability to continue practicing slavery—as well as other states 
and jurisdictions. 8  During the post-Reconstruction period, Louisiana and 
Mississippi blazed the trail for other Southern states in disfranchising Black 
citizens through poll taxes and literacy tests, often exempting Whites 
through grandfather clauses. 9  By ruling such methods and devices 
constitutional in 1898, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for their 
proliferation throughout the South.10 These laws would remain in effect until 
the enactment of the VRA in 1965. After decades of Jim Crow, when support 
for integration entered the political mainstream, elected representatives of 
these same Southern states drafted and signed the Southern Manifesto 
(1956) expressing their opposition to federal desegregation efforts.11 Thus, 
Southern states were flashpoints in the American civil rights movement. 
Their often violent resistance to desegregation ushered in the Civil Rights era 
of formal equality at law, including voting rights and protections embodied in 
the VRA.12  
 
6 Id. 
7 Section 5 of the VRA required states covered under Section 4 to seek federal preclearance for any 
changes to voting laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).  Shelby County held that Section 4 was 
unconstitutional, effectively nullifying Section 5 as well. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2615.  
8 With the exception of some jurisdictions, covered states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 
2620.  
9 Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive 
Era, Part 3: Black Disfranchisement From the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 835, 845 (1982). 
10 Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); see also Schmidt, supra note 9, at 848.  
11 The Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REC.  3948 (1956). 
12 Cho, supra note 3, at 1605. 
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 An overwhelming amount of social scientific evidence demonstrates 
that current conditions in jurisdictions covered by Section 4 are consistent 
with past conditions. Not only do “elevated rates of voter discrimination 
remain a serious concern in the covered jurisdictions,”13 which was verified 
by the Congressional Record supporting the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, 
but the covered states continue to be among “the worst of the worst actors.”14 
Since 2010,  
 
Six of the nine fully covered states have passed new voting 
restrictions…including voter ID laws (Alabama, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, Texas and Virginia), limits on early voting 
(Georgia) and restrictions on voter registration (Alabama and 
Texas). But only one-third of non-covered jurisdictions passed 
similar restrictions during the same period.15 
 
 Shelby County claims that there is sufficient racial progress or 
transcendence to warrant the elimination of Section 5 voter protections. In 
the two main arguments, Chief Justice Roberts’ quotes his own opinion in 
Northwest Austin Municipality Utility District Number One (2009): (1) 
“things have changed in the South,” and (2) the “evil that Section 5 is meant 
to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for 
preclearance.”16 In other words, Jim Crow is over; remedies meant to address 
systemic subordination and oppression are antiquated and unnecessarily 
burdensome. Even if this argument is unconvincing, Roberts claims that the 
South should not be specially scrutinized because voter discrimination does 
not exclusively occur in the South. But the premise of the VRA is not that 
voter discrimination occurs exclusively in the South, which is why the 
Fifteenth Amendment covers voter discrimination in the United States 
13 David C. Kimball, Judges Are Not Social Scientists (Yet), 12 ELECTION L. J. 324 (2013). 
14 Ari Berman, Why Are Conservatives Trying to Destroy the Voting Rights Act?, THE NATION, Feb. 
5, 2013. Berman explains that, although the number of Black elected officials and voters have 
greatly increased since the VRA, voting restrictions and redistricting maps are contemporary 
methods of discriminatory disfranchisement utilized to dilute the power of a Black electorate.  In 
a modern version of the Southern Strategy  
Republicans used their control of state legislatures following the 2010 election to pass 
redistricting maps that have led to a re-segregation of Southern politics, placing as many 
Democratic lawmakers into as few majority-minority districts as possible as a way to 
maximize the number of white Republican seats.  
GOP-controlled Virginia recently redrew its maps “to reduce Democratic seats by diluting black 
voting strength in at least eight districts.” Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-3 (2009).  
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generally. Rather, the VRA is needed because voter discrimination continues 
to be very disproportionately concentrated in covered states.  
 
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court adopted Roberts’ position and in a 
predictable 5-4 decision, ruled that Section 4 of the VRA is unconstitutional 
because its coverage formula is outdated, “based on decades-old data and 
eradicated practices.”17 Within two hours of the release of the decision in 
Shelby County, Texas rushed to redraw district lines and soon began to 
enforce strict photo identification rules. Both practices had previously been 
found to be discriminatory by a federal court.18 Texas read Shelby County as 
license and impunity for discriminatory redistricting.19  
B. Race-Neutral Universalism 
 Post-racial jurisprudence abandons the policy of race-based remedies 
for race-based wrongs “in favor of seemingly universal solutions.” 20  The 
methods by which courts have traditionally reproduced racial hierarchy that 
can be seen in Shelby County include the utilization of seemingly neutral, but 
racially contingent, legal rationales, doctrines and principles.21 These include 
the refusal of the federal government to hold “concurrent jurisdiction with 
states over civil rights,” and the concession to “home rule” in Southern states, 
using the legal principle of federalism based on states’ rights.22  
 Federalism based on states’ rights, however, can only appear neutral 
when it is socially and historically de-contextualized. 23  In context, the 
racialized nature of its development and utilization is clear, particularly as a 
means of achieving what Critical Race Scholar Derrick Bell calls “racial 
compromise.” Racial compromise is “a process whereby disparate groups of 
whites settle their political differences in a process that involves the 
17 Shelby Cnty. at 3, 18, 20, 33.  
18 State v. Holder, 888 F. Supp.2d 113 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2012), Vacated by, remanded by Texas v. 
Holder, 2013 U.S. Lexis 4937 (U.S., June 27, 2013), State of Texas v. United States of America, 
887 F. Supp.2d 133 (Dist. Ct D.C.) (2013) vacated by, remanded by Texas v. United States, 2013 
U.S. LEXIS 4927 (2013).   
19 Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES, JULY 5, 2013. 
20 Cho, supra note 3, at 1601. 
21 Id. at 1606-1611. 
22 Id. 
23 Even the methods and devices of disfranchisement such as literacy tests and grandfather 
clauses that are now admitted to be discriminatory, including by conservatives, were once ruled 
Constitutional.  These rulings were based on the rhetorically universal, but racially contingent, 
rationale of “equal application.”  A law shall be considered non-discriminatory when it appears to 
apply to all citizens, regardless of its impact or intent. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 
(1898); Schmidt 1982, supra note 11, at 846.  
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involuntary sacrifice of Blacks.” 24  Bell finds that the “ultimate racial 
compromise” was the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877, which formally and 
abruptly terminated Reconstruction and ushered in the Jim Crow era by 
conceding “home rule” to the South. 25  To achieve “national unity”—the 
consolidation of power among White citizenries of the North and South—
disparate, conflicting groups of Whites resolved the problem of fractured 
governance and Democratic-Republican political strife by abandoning 
Reconstruction, and thus, the recently emancipated slaves to White-
supremacist retribution. In exchange for support in electing President Hayes, 
Republicans agreed to give Democrats “home rule” under the auspices of 
“equal sovereignty of the states,” the same limiting principle invoked by the 
majority opinion in Shelby County.26 Using “neutral-sounding [but racially 
contingent] rationales such as ‘no private constitutional rights,’ ‘no special 
rights,’ and ‘equal application’” the Supreme Court agreed that there should 
be no federal interference forcing Southern states to comply with civil 
rights.27 Since then, invoking states’ rights, home rule or respect for state 
and local processes in the South has become a “dog whistle” political code for 
obstruction of racial justice, to deny as much as possible the rights granted in 
the Reconstruction Amendments.28  
24 Cho, supra note 3, at 1606 (discussing DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 40-47 
(5TH ED. 2004). 
25 Id. 
26 The South was a stronghold of the Democratic Party prior to the electoral realignment that 
occurred after Democrats began to support civil rights legislation, especially after Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the VRA of 1965 under Democratic President Lyndon B. 
Johnson. The former Confederate states became Republican strongholds after Republicans 
adopted the “Southern Strategy” -- racist pandering through “dog whistle” coded messages about 
“states’ rights” and then “law and order,” the latter tapping into anxiety about prospective or 
emerging social change.  Dog Whistle politics continues to figure prominently in the political 
ideology of the right and the most conservative part of the Republican Party. Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown, Racial Change, and The Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.L. REV.7 (1994); See generally, IAN 
HANEY LOPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & 
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014). 
27 Cho, supra note 3, at 1608. 
28 The Reconstruction Amendments include the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution—respectively outlawing slavery, and guaranteeing equal 
protection and voting rights. U.S. Const. Amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.; U.S. CONST. 
Amend. XV. For a more thorough explanation of the origins and politics of Shelby County, see 
Berman, supra note 14. Berman explains Justice Roberts’ advocacy against Section 2 of the VRA 
prior to his appointment to the Court and the interrelationship between his jurisprudence and the 
conservative advocacy of Ed Blum, founder of a legal defense fund organized to fight the VRA. See 
also Zack Beauchamp, How Racism Caused the Shutdown, THINK PROGRESS, October 9, 2013. 
Beauchamp explains that, like states’ rights during de jure segregation, advocacy of a “minimalist 
federal government” during de facto segregation is dog whistle rhetorical device that appears 
racially neutral because it implies government non-intervention into the marketplace. However, it 
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 Shelby County exemplifies the application of a racially contingent legal 
principle. It appears universal—federalism based on states’ rights—but it is a 
form of racial compromise deployed to destroy or eliminate Section 5 voter 
protection for African Americans. Shelby County held that federal oversight 
of and intervention in the way in which the South chooses to handle matters 
related to the voting rights of minorities is a violation of the “equal 
sovereignty of the states.” 29 The claim that “things have changed in the 
South” sufficient to warrant eradication of minority voter protections is an 
example of both descriptive and operational racial transcendence. 
C. Moral Equivalence Between Racism and Race-  
 based Civil Rights Remedies 
 During the Shelby County hearing, Justice Scalia, who later concurred 
in the majority opinion, commented that the VRA is a “perpetuation of racial 
entitlement.” 30  Justice Sotomayor, who dissented, replied that, 
“Discrimination is discrimination. It’s ongoing today. This is not racial 
entitlement; this is about a basic fundamental right that for so many years 
America ignored.”31 Racial entitlement has historically meant that Whiteness 
is treated as “a valuable form of property recognized and enshrined by law as 
a normative civic and legal ideal.” 32 The absence of this property interest has 
meant a lack of the benefits of citizenship, including the right to vote. 33 
Scalia’s remark implies that protection of minority enfranchisement is 
morally equivalent to the racial entitlement of long-standing, historical White 
supremacy.  
D. Distancing Move 
Justice Souter has described the persistence of minority voter suppression 
tactics in the South into the new millennium as pouring “old poison into new 
bottles,” precisely what Section 5 was meant to prevent the covered 
jurisdictions from doing or allowing. 34  Similarly, deploying race-neutral, 
is actually the product of an alliance between economic libertarians among Republican Party 
conservatives and racial conservatives of the old Democratic Party that forged today’s more 
conservative Republican Party. 
29 Shelby Cnty., supra note 1, at 6. 
30 Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia: Reauthorized Voting Rights Act was ‘perpetuation of racial 
entitlement,’ A.B.A. J., Feb. 28, 2013,  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_reauthorized_voting_rights_act_was_perpetuation
_of_racial_entitlemen/ (Last visited September 1, 2013). 
31 Id.  
32 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1701, 1713-14 (1993). 
33 Id. 
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seemingly universal principles and the co-optation of civil rights discourse for 
racially regressive purposes is not a new form of racial compromise.  Racial 
subordination is disguised in the conservative post-racial jurisprudence of 
Shelby County where claims of racial progress, transcendence and moral 
equivalence “do the ideological work of colorblindness without so much of its 
retro-regressive baggage.” 35  Conservative post-racialist jurisprudence 
promotes a “general distancing from standard civil rights approaches”36 by   
providing a veneer of newness to old politics.  
II.  Racial Compromise 
In the racial-dictatorship era, unreconstructed white normativity 
prevailed and legislatures passed laws that were clearly ‘race-d’ to 
disadvantage peoples of color under the auspice of ‘states-rights’-based 
federalism. The courts in the racial-dictatorship era provided little 
relief. Indeed, courts eviscerated the meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments and civil-rights statutes by using seemingly neutral 
strategies to disenfranchise peoples of color in lockstep with 
sociopolitical forces that sought to restore the South’s honor.37 
 From the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877 to Jim Crow; from the 
Southern Manifesto to the Southern Strategy, the timeline recording the 
struggle for racial justice is replete with instances of racial compromise 
achieved by “race-neutral” means. Racial compromise denies full citizenship 
by reducing Black citizens to symbols deployed in the performance of political 
theater—a process of structural violence that interlocks with physical 
violence, to which governments on the local, state and federal levels have 
often been complicit.38 During the post-Civil War era, in what sociologists 
Omi and Winant 39  identify as a racial dictatorship, the Reconstruction 
Amendments provided a “brief respite,” a transient benefit granted because 
of  “an interest convergence in maintaining Republican Party influence in the 
South.”40 Similarly, the decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education that 
35 Cho, supra note 3, at 1599. 
36 Id.   
37 Id. at 1606. 
38 Anthony Paul Farley, Lacan & Voting Rights, 13 YALE J. L & HUMAN. 283 (2001), hereinafter 
Farley 2001; Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia And Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, And The 
Myth Of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2023 (1993). 
39 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S 
TO THE 1990S, at 71 (2d ed. 1994), cited in Cho, supra note 3, at 1606.  
40 Cho, supra note 3, at 1606. Interest convergence theory postulates that civil rights gains are 
conditional, contingent and fleeting; that “…substantive legal gains for racial minorities seldom 
occur unless they converge or are at least perceived as converging with the interests of white 
elites…as advancing, or at least not hindering, the material interests of dominant groups.” 
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held segregation of public schools unconstitutional, and the political victories 
of the Civil Rights Movement that followed during the 1950s-60s, including 
the VRA, resulted from an interest convergence with Cold War era politics 
“largely driven by geopolitical concerns.”41 To fulfill its aspiration of being 
perceived as a global symbol of democracy in light of Soviet propaganda to 
the contrary, the United States was compelled to rehabilitate its image when 
the international spotlight fell on Jim Crow segregation and racial violence in 
the South. The US government also needed to appease Black veterans 
aggrieved by the irony of returning to Jim Crow after contributing to a war 
effort against racist regimes in Europe.42  
 Shortly after passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Supreme 
Court deployed “limiting principles” to eviscerate them.43 Terrorism against 
Black voters and the Black population in general burgeoned, particularly in 
the form of lynching conducted by “vigilantes.” White supremacist 
paramilitary organizations such as the Klan generated a sense of solidarity 
and community among White participants through violent reassertion of the 
boundaries of racial identity and power.44  
 The current Republican agenda has its historical corollary, but its 
modus operandi has necessarily changed from the old conservatism of 
Southern Democrats in response to the racial consciousness of the Civil 
William M. Carter, The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV.  21, 23 (2011).  
41 Carter, supra note 40, at 24 (discussing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND 
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) and her history describing the relationship between 
American foreign policy and the civil rights movement in the United States); see also Jennifer G. 
Correa, The Targeting of the East Los Angeles Brown Berets by a Racial Patriarchal Capitalist 
State: Merging Intersectionality and Social Movement Research, 37 CRIT. SOCIO. 83, 95 (2011).  
42 Correa, supra note 41, at 95.  
43 Cho, supra note 3, at 1611. 
44 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, “Creating A Truth And Reconciliation Commission For Lynching,” 21 LAW & 
INEQ. 263, 294 (2003); Farley, supra note 38; see also Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as 
Fetish Object, 76 OREGON L. REV. 457 (1997). In a general sense, segregationist politicians, 
through racially charged official discourse and “law and order” actions, created the optimal 
political conditions for racial violence, and where politically expedient, governmental officials 
have been accessories to racial violence, particularly lynchings.  Federal government complicity to 
racist violence did not stop at lynching. For decades the US Senate blocked anti-lynching 
legislation, finally apologizing for its obstructionism in 2005. “Nearly 200 anti-lynching bills were 
introduced, three of which made it past the lower House of Representatives between 1920 and 
1940. But despite the support of seven US presidents, the Senate stopped any of them becoming 
law.” “Senate apologizes over lynchings,” BBC News, June 14, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4090732.stm (Last visited September 1, 2013). See also 
Beauchamp, supra note 28. Beauchamp explains that the refusal to pass an anti-lynching bill was 
due to a tacit political bargain struck during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency that in exchange 
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Rights era, which was generated in the broader context of anti-colonial 
struggle following World War II. The reproduction of racial hierarchy has had 
to shift from de jure articulation to quieter, de facto, configurations. Restoring 
Southern honor and expunging “unfair stigma” from the South—without a 
comparable level of commitment to civil rights—has been a mainstay of 
Southern conservatism for the century and half since the Civil War. 
Restoring Southern honor is not about racial justice, but the management of 
public perception while maintaining racial hierarchy. Though the 
Reconstruction Amendments are unconditional in their guarantees, interest 
convergence theory explains the political contingency of their 
implementation 45  and the precarious social condition of those whom the 
statutes were intended to protect.   
 In the post-Cold War era of US-driven globalization and global 
economic governance, federal advocacy of civil rights has diminished in key 
ways, requiring examination of contemporary racial compromise. “Southern 
conservatives had long opposed the VRA, but until recently they were a 
minority within the GOP.” 46  Commentators have recently observed that 
present day Conservatives have challenged the VRA for three reasons: (1) the 
makeup of the Republican party has become Whiter, more Southern and 
more conservative 47 ; (2) there is substantial funding for conservative 
advocates who have been trying for a quarter century to destroy the VRA,48 
and (3) because the Republican Party has failed to attract a substantial 
portion of minority votes, it focuses efforts, instead, on suppressing the votes 
of an “increasingly diverse electorate” in order to maintain power.49 
 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts (1986-2007) have been post-Civil 
Rights Courts 50 in which the Colorblindness Doctrine prevailed and civil 
rights claims of White men and women in employment discrimination and 
45 Interest convergence theory “does not contend that individual whites perform a conscious 
calculus of whether certain advances in racial justice will work in their material self-interest. 
Rather [it] suggests that whites are likely to react adversely to civil rights measures that they 
perceive as solely benefiting racial minorities.” Carter, supra note 40, at 25. It is also “not merely 
a variation on the theme that ‘all law is politics,’” but with regard to judges, especially Supreme 
Court Justices, “given the narrow segment of the mostly white elite from which federal judges 
(and especially Supreme Court Justices) are drawn, interest convergence theory suggests their 
worldview and life experience will generally be such that remedies perceived as benefiting only 
people of color are unlikely to find their favor.” Id. 
46 Ari Berman, Destroying the Voting Rights Act, THE NATION, Feb. 8, 2013.  
47 Id., Beauchamp, supra note 28. 
48 Berman, supra note 14. 
49 Id. 
50 Prior to his appointment, Chief Justice Rehnquist was a vocal segregationist. Cho, supra note 3, 
at 1614-16. His successor, Chief Justice Roberts, delivered the majority opinion in Shelby County.  
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affirmative action cases gained favor.51 Roberts’ majority opinion in Shelby 
County selectively highlighted slight evidence to support claims of racial 
progress and transcendence. The conclusion that protection is no longer 
needed is unsupported by the social science record.52 When viewed in social 
and historical context, demonstrably discriminatory (though updated) 
methods of disfranchisement of the sort and in the sites that Sections 4 and 5 
of the VRA intended to remedy continue to exist.  
 By presuming racial transcendence, a Post-Civil Rights Court is 
transmuting the normative, aspirational race-neutral universalism of 
colorblind jurisprudence into a conservative jurisprudence of post racialism. 
As Shelby County demonstrates, the presumption of racial transcendence 
makes race-neutral universalism appear both descriptive and operational, 
and therefore “authorizes the retreat from race” and distancing from the civil 
rights remedies provided by the VRA. 
 
51 Id.; “Colorblindness recognizes racial discrimination as a private, individual, or episodic 
aberration detached from public or structural explanations. Hence, colorblindness promotes the 
reconciliation of the irreconcilable: racists exist as individuals apart from any systemic race 
problem,” an ideology that “furthers racial inequality.” Osagie K. Obasogie, Anything but a 
Hypocrite: Interactional Musings on Race, Colorblindness, and the Redemption of Strom 
Thurmond, 18 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 451, 491-2 (2006).  
52 Kimball, supra note 13, at 325. 
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